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Maciej Falkowski
The eastern part of the Northern Caucasus (Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia) is  becoming 
an increasingly distinct region in cultural, civilisational and social terms when compared to the 
rest of the Russian Federation. The situation on the ground there bears greater resemblance to 
the Middle East than to Russia: Islam is the key factor organising socio-political life, and conflicts 
inside the Muslim community, often involving bloodshed, are the driving power of develop-
ments in the region. The conflict is between the two main branches of Islam in the Northern Ca-
ucasus: Sufism linked to the official clergy and government, and Salafism which is gaining more 
and more supporters among young people in the Caucasus. Tension, including clashes over 
mosques, attacks, mass detentions, etc. has been observed mainly in Dagestan and Ingushetia.
Sufism and Salafism, and the perennial conflict between the two, are essential elements of 
the Northern Caucasian political puzzle, as is resorting to the use of violence. They have in-
fluenced the development of the situation and have been used in political games on many 
occasions. A similar situation can be seen at present – the Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, 
who wants to strengthen his position in the region, is trying to assume the role of protector 
of Sufism and suppressor of Salafism. This magnifies the destabilising potential of the conflict 
and may pose the risk of an escalation of violence in the Northern Caucasus. 
Sufism and Salafism in the Northern 
Caucasus
Sufism is the mystical trend in Islam. Its external 
manifestation is the operation of Sufi brotherho-
ods (tariqas, such as Qadiriyya, Naqshbandiyya). 
It emphasises the need to learn to know God 
in the mystical way, beyond the mind, as well 
as the importance of traditional and spiritual 
leaders (sheikhs or ustazes) who are believed 
to be the intermediaries between God and 
man. Sufism is deeply rooted in the history of 
the Northern Caucasus. Various local factions 
of Sufi brotherhoods (wirds) are essential ele-
ments of the religious and social structure. They 
also play an important political role, and the le-
aders and members of Sufi communities form 
local elites (they predominate among the offi-
cial clergy; many Northern Caucasian politicians 
are members of Sufi wirds)1.
Salafism can in turn be defined as a purist 
trend in Sunni Islam drawing upon the ‘pure’ 
Islam, which was practised in the first ages of 
its existence. One of its characteristics is its 
extreme legalism and rejection of traditions 
which are not justified by the Quran and the 
hadiths. Salafism is a very extensive move-
ment: its nature can be apolitical and peaceful 
1 Sufism, for example, was the ideological and organisa-
tional foundation of the anti-feudal and anti-Russian 
uprisings of Caucasian highlanders in the 19th century. 
Imam Shamil, the best-known leader of insurgents, the 
founder of the Islamic state in Dagestan and Chechnya 
in the 19th century, who is viewed as a national hero by 
Dagestanis and Chechens, was a Sufi sheikh. 
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(Salafi communities focusing on religious life) 
as well as political and armed (the struggle, 
including by use of arms, to set up an Islamic 
state). Salafi communities are a relatively new 
phenomenon in the Caucasus. They emerged 
in connection with the crisis caused by the 
collapse of the USSR, the renewal of links be-
tween post-Soviet Muslims and the Islamic 
world, and the socio-economic changes (inc-
luding identity issues) that affected this area. 
Young people, often originating from social gro-
ups which have been pushed to the margins and 
deprived of any hope for the future by the politico-
-economic system based on clan and mafia con-
nections predominate among Salafis. The most 
dynamic Salafi communities operate in the cities 
(although Salafi villages also exist in Dagestan)2. 
Both branches have their own leaders3 and in-
stitutions (for example, an institution known 
2 At present, for example, Novosasitli, Kvanada and 
Gubden. A Salafi enclave, uncontrolled by the govern-
ment, covering the Kadar Jamaat (the villages Kadar, 
Karamakhi and other) operated in the 1990s in central 
Dagestan. It was liquidated as a result of a military oper-
ation launched by federal troops in 1999.
3 The best-known Dagestani Salafi leaders include: Israpil 
Ahmednabiyev (Abu Umar Sasitlinsky, who is at present 
in exile, in Turkey or Lebanon), Nadir Medetov (Nadir 
Abu Khalid, at present he is fighting in Syria for Islam-
ic State), and Muhammad Nabi Sildinsky. Ingushetia’s 
most popular preachers are Khamzat Chumakov and Isa 
Tsechoev. The Sufi leaders include Salakh Mezhiev (muf-
ti of Chechnya), Ahmad Abdullaev (mufti of Dagestan), 
Isa Khamkhoev (mufti of Ingushetia), Muhammadrasul 
Saaduev (imam of the central mosque in Makhachkala), 
and the Dagestani sheikhs Badrudin Kadyrov and Ghazi 
Magomed Rabadanov. Many leaders have gone missing 
as a consequence of mafia feuds or attacks plotted by the 
Islamic military underground (for example, the Dagestani 
sheikhs Said Chirkeysky and Sirajuddin Tabasaransky). 
as the Council of Scholars Ahlus-Sunnah wa al-
-Jamaa leads Salafis in Dagestan; in turn, Sufis 
control the Spiritual Boards of Muslims in indi-
vidual republics). They have their own mosqu-
es, companies, Sharia courts, charities, media 
(including social media)4 and quite often also 
armed groups. Some of the Salafi communities 
have links with the armed Islamic underground 
and are a natural source of recruits and serve 
as its ideological base. However, these links 
are not obvious or automatic (numerous Salafi 
communities have dissociated themselves from 
armed struggle), and the decision to join the 
guerrilla forces is as a rule made by individuals 
(and not communities) very often in effect of 
repressions from law enforcement agencies. 
Sufism is the mainstay of local Islam, understo-
od as being derived from local customs (which 
do not necessarily comply with the Islamic or-
thodoxy). It is bound to the global Ummah only 
on the level of declarations, and is dominated 
by the older and the middle generations. Its 
supporters call it ‘traditional’ Islam, while Sa-
lafis see it as a heresy contradicting the basic 
pillar of Islam (monotheism). In turn, Salafism 
is a revolutionary, anti-system trend dominated 
by young people, attracting active individuals, 
contesting the status quo (including the religio-
us one) and it strongly identifies itself with glo-
bal Islam. In the post-Soviet area, it is viewed 
(partly as a consequence of propaganda) as an 
ideology imported from outside and is iden-
tified with terrorism. Opponents of Salafism 
refer to it as ‘Wahhabism’. This term, inaccu-
rate from the academic point of view, is also 
widely used in the media and political life in 
post-Soviet countries (for example, by Ramzan 
Kadyrov) and has a pejorative meaning.
Rivalry and conflicts between the two branches 
(very often involving violence: armed clashes, 
terrorist attacks, etc.) have been an ever-present 
art of religious and social life in the Northern Ca-
ucasus for a quarter of a century. The situation 
4 For example, http://vk.com/sovetuchenih, www.http://
serdce-chechni.ru, www.ansar.ru, http://alansar.ru/
Conflicts between Sufism and Salafism 
have been an immanent part of religious 
and social life in the Northern Caucasus. 
The situation is additionally complicat-
ed by the Russian government’s policy, 
which contributes to the escalation of 
tension.
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is additionally complicated by the Russian gover-
nment’s policy, which contributes to the escala-
tion of tension. In Soviet times, the government 
persecuted Sufi communities, viewing them as 
an uncontrolled manifestation of religious life. 
The situation changed in the 1990s, when there 
was a period of revival of religious life and Sufi 
communities began to be treated as an ally in 
combating independent Islamic movements and 
organisations treated as a threat. Initially, one 
exception was Chechnya, where the indepen-
dence movement was interwoven with Sufism, 
which is an essential element of the Chechen 
national identity5. Between the First and the Se-
cond Chechen Wars (1996–1999), when Chech-
nya was beyond Moscow’s control, the Russian 
secret services would regularly use radical Salafi 
groupings (which were often engaged in organi-
sed crime, including kidnapping for ransom) to 
destabilise the situation in a republic governed 
by supporters of independence. The chaos in 
Chechnya was expected to provide the Russian 
government with a pretext for bringing troops 
there again. 
The beginning of the Second Chechen War (au-
tumn 1999) was a breakthrough moment for the 
further development of the political and religio-
us situation in the Caucasus. At that time, the 
so-called ‘anti-terrorist’ operation was launched, 
5 Mainly the faction (wird) of the Qadiriyya brotherhood 
set up by Kunta-haji Kishiev in the second half of the 19th 
century to which most Chechens belong (dozens of oth-
er wirds operate in the republic in addition to this one). 
Sufism is so strong in Chechnya and Ingushetia partly 
because both of these regions were Islamised in the 19th 
century mainly with the help of Sufi brotherhoods. Even 
to external observers, the Sufi religious ritual zikr (the 
ecstatic circle dance) has become a symbol of Chechnya 
and of the Chechen craving for independence. 
targeted at not only Chechen separatists but 
also at Caucasian Salafis. The informal co-ope-
ration between the Russian secret services and 
Salafi groupings was discontinued in Chech-
nya, and crackdowns began. The alliance with 
a section of separatists led by the Sufi mufti of 
Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov, became the basis 
of the Russian policy towards the republic. Su-
fism was rehabilitated and in fact became the re-
public’s ‘national religion’ and one of the pillars 
of the Kadyrov clan’s power (in 2004, Akhmad 
was replaced by his son, Ramzan, who has built 
a dictatorship based on terror in Chechnya)6. 
Brutal repressions against Salafi communities 
began across the Caucasus, and have continu-
ed ever since with varying intensity. One of its 
effects was the setting up of the Islamic military 
underground in the Caucasian republics which 
paved the way for the Caucasus Emirate, which 
was proclaimed in 20077. The repressions took 
the most brutal form in Chechnya, where Salafis 
cannot function openly, and manifesting Salafi 
views (even having such external attributes as 
a beard without a moustache or shorter trouser 
legs) can be punished by death. The situation in 
Dagestan and Ingushetia is quite different. Re-
pressions are also present there, but Salafi com-
munities can still function, and the government 
would even open dialogue with them from time 
to time8. At those times when pressure on Salafis 
6 Sufis have complete control of the muftiate of Chechn-
ya; all mosques are also under their control. Member-
ship of one of the Sufi wirds and participation in Sufi 
rituals is in fact compulsory. Sufism is also propagated 
by the Chechen media. 
7 The Caucasus Emirate which was established in place 
of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria is, according to its 
members’ declarations, an Islamic state extending over 
the Northern Caucasus under Russian occupation. In 
fact, it is an underground armed terrorist organisation. 
Since the deaths of its three subsequent leaders (Dokka 
Umarov, Aliaskhab Kebekov and Magomed Suleimanov) 
in 2013–2015, the emirate has been leaderless.
8 In Dagestan, dialogue of this kind was seen under the 
presidency of Magomedsalam Magomedov (2010–2013). 
It was interrupted after the death of Sheikh Said Chirkeys-
ky (Dagestan’s most influential Sufi leader) in a suicide 
attack plotted by the Caucasus Emirate (August 2013). 
A similar policy – regardless of resistance from the Spiri-
tual Directorate of Muslims of Ingushetia – has been pur-
sued for years by the president of Ingushetia, Yunus-bek 
Yevkurov.
The outbreak of the Second Chechen 
War in the Russian Caucasus marked the 
beginning of the persecution of Salafi 
communities, which have continued to 
the present day with varying intensity. 
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is increased, the military underground becomes 
more active since more desperate people are re-
ady to join the guerrilla troops (the war in Syria 
(where thousands of residents of the Caucasian 
republics of the Russian Federation have gone to 
fight in the jihad) has served as such a ‘safety 
valve’ over the past few years9). The situation usu-
ally calms down when the government tolerates 
peaceful Salafi communities and opens dialogue 
with them (this situation has been seen over the 
past few years in Ingushetia, one effect of which 
is the stabilisation of the internal situation).
Despite the persecution, Salafism is currently 
the most rapidly developing branch of Islam 
in the Caucasus and among migrants from the 
Caucasus (for example, among Chechens in Eu-
rope and among emigrants from the Caucasus 
settling in other Russian regions). Everything 
seems to indicate that this trend will continue 
because Salafism is ideologically appealing to 
the younger generation. 
The new wave of confrontation
Religious conflicts in the Caucasus clearly esca-
lated in late 2015/early 2016 (mainly in Dagestan 
and Ingushetia). The Dagestani government (in 
co-operation with the Spiritual Board of Mus-
lims) has intensified anti-Salafi measures, inc-
luding arrests and mass detentions of people 
praying in mosques (for example, in Derbent, 
9 For more information see: Maciej Falkowski, Józef 
Lang, Homo jihadicus, OSW Report, September 
2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-re-
port/2015-09-21/homo-jihadicus
Makhachkala, Khasavyurt and Kizilyurt10), for-
cing imams upon Salafi communities (for exam-
ple, at the mosque in Makhachkala11), setting 
fire to Salafi mosques (for example, in Derbent). 
What provoked the greatest outrage among Sa-
lafi communities was the campaign of closing 
the mosques they controlled, for example in 
Makhachkala and Khasavyurt. This met with or-
ganised resistance (January 2016). When the Sa-
lafi mosque (known as the ‘northern’ mosque) 
was closed, thousands of young Salafis took to 
the streets and demanded that the city govern-
ment hand back the keys12. The scale of the de-
monstration and the fact that it was organised, 
as well as open statements from Salafi leaders 
who announced they would fight for their ri-
ghts, surprised the government so much that it 
was forced to agree to open the mosque again. 
On the one hand, this revealed the weakness of 
the republic’s government, and on the other it 
demonstrated the strength and determination 
of the local Salafi community. 
Ingushetia, in turn, is the scene of the con-
flict between the republic’s leader, Yunus-bek 
Yevkurov (in office since 2008) and mufti Isa 
Khamkhoev and the official clergy and Sufi 
brotherhoods who support Khamkhoev13. The 
subject of their dispute is the Ingush govern-
ment’s policy towards Islam: Yevkurov is trying 
to convince the muftiate to open dialogue and 
co-operation with all Muslim communities, 
including peaceful Salafis, whose presence he 
tolerated  if they did not break the law. The 
official clergy and the Sufi circles from which 
the clergy originates are opposed to this be-
cause they view the independent communities 
and the popular Islamic leaders as competi-
10 http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/277411/
11 http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/272887/
12 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CF-p05lgCuo
13 The role of Sufism in Ingushetia is similar to the one it 
plays in Chechnya. It is an essential element of the ethnic 
identity. Ingush people have their own wirds (brother-
hood factions), mainly from the Qadiriyya school. The 
largest are the wirds that were established in the 19th 
century by the students of Kunta-haji Kishiev – Batal-haji 
Belkhoroev and Hussein-haji Gardanov.
Despite the persecution, Salafism is cur-
rently the most rapidly expanding branch of 
Islam in the Caucasus and among migrants 
from the Caucasus. Everything seems to in-
dicate that this trend will continue.
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tors and a threat to their own position. The 
republic has seen numerous conflicts between 
Salafis and members of Sufi brotherhoods 
(riots, disputes over mosques, etc.). The most 
serious took place in June 2015 (the conflict 
over the Nasir-kort mosque, where the popu-
lar Salafi preacher Khamzat Chumakov is the 
imam14; furthermore, an unsuccessful attack 
on Chumakov was staged on 11 March 2016). 
In December 2015, Yevkurov stated that the 
mufti had to resign, the muftiate needed to be 
reformed, and its competences had to be re-
stricted15. In turn, Khamkhoev convened a con-
gress of representatives of his own clan (teip) 
and received support from the president of 
Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, who has tense re-
lations with Yevkurov (Kadyrov also supported 
Khamkhoev financially16).
Kadyrov’s play
One factor that is stoking the present phase of 
the conflict between the various branches of 
Islam in Dagestan and Ingushetia is the inter-
ference from Kadyrov, who wants to be seen 
as the one who protects ‘real’ (i.e. Sufi) Islam in 
the Caucasus from Salafism/terrorism. An un-
precedented meeting (majlis) of representatives 
of twenty-four factions of Sufi brotherhoods 
(representing both Naqshbandiyya and Qadiri-
yya) from Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia 
was held on 2 February 2016 in Grozny. Its par-
14 http://kavpolit.com/articles/molitva_razdora-17260/; 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9mWFc7dY-Qs
15 http://galgayche.org/?p=2144
16 http://galgayche.org/?p=4302
ticipants passed an ‘anti-Wahhabi’ declaration 
in which they undertook to refrain from main-
taining contacts with representatives of Salaf-
ism17. During the congress, Kadyrov announced 
he would combat ‘Wahhabism’ across the Cau-
casus and even across Russia, thus expressing 
his readiness to help out the governments of 
the neighbouring republics, which was in fact 
a threat that the conflict would be escalated. 
Both he and his milieu (including the mufti of 
Chechnya, Salakh Mezhiev and the parliamen-
tary speaker, Magomed Daudov) have issued 
numerous threats to Salafi leaders (mainly from 
Ingushetia). They have also criticised the gov-
ernments of Dagestan and Ingushetia for what 
they saw as an overly lenient policy towards 
Salafis. 
The main motivation behind Kadyrov’s engage-
ment in religious conflicts in the neighbouring 
republics is his political ambition – the desire to 
strengthen his own position and to become the 
leader of the entire region (and even of all Rus-
sian Muslims). His interference in the Sufi-Salafi 
conflict is merely an instrument to achieve this 
goal. However, Kadyrov’s ambitions are not only 
a personal issue. They correspond to the tradi-
tionally high aspirations of the Chechen public 
to play a more important role in the Caucasus. 
These aspirations are the result of the size of the 
population (they are the largest nation in the re-
gion), and the sense of strength, exceptionality, 
superiority, and pride in their own achievements 
(victory in the First Chechen War in 1994–1996 
against Moscow without any external help, re-
building the republic out of the rubble of war, 
the participation of Chechens in military con-
flicts outside the Caucasus, for example, in 
Georgia, Syria and Donbass in Ukraine, Kady-
rov’s exceptionally strong position in Russia18, 
successes of Chechen athletes, etc.). 
17 http://www.onkavkaz.com/news/695-kadyrov-i-hamho-
ev-objavili-voinu-salafitam-ingushetii.html
18 See, for example, the report on Kadyrov from the Russian 
opposition activist, Ilya Yashin A Threat to national se-
curity; https://vk.com/doc279938622_437299182?hash 
=44c052d71ac47f6c24&dl=c16291d3cb49537d59
The interference from the Chechen lead-
er, Ramzan Kadyrov, who wants to be 
viewed as the one who protects Sufi Islam 
from Salafism/terrorism, is one of the fac-
tors escalating the conflicts between the 
various branches of Islam.
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The risk of an escalation of violence
Given the vast significance of Islam in the so-
cio-political life of the present-day Caucasus 
and the polarisation of local societies concern-
ing religious issues, the escalating conflict be-
tween the Salafi and the Sufi communities has 
a great destabilising potential. Additional risk 
factors include the deteriorating economic sit-
uation in Russia and the increasing pauperisa-
tion in the Caucasian republics; and this may 
contribute to a radicalisation of sentiments. 
However, the potential engagement of Chech-
ens in the conflict may be of key significance, 
since this multiplies the risk of an escalation of 
violence. 
Regardless of endless conflicts and tensions, 
the political, ethnic, religious and clan-mafia 
system in Dagestan, whose society is a con-
glomerate of various ethnic groups, local ja-
maats (informal historically conditioned terri-
torial communities), religious groups, etc., is 
relatively stable. Their large number and the 
fact that neither of them clearly predominates 
in society have forced them to develop compro-
mises over the past twenty-five years based on 
the fragile balance of power. The situation in 
Ingushetia is reminiscent of that in Dagestan, 
although the ethnic variety factor is missing 
there (ethnic Ingush account for over 95% of 
the population). External interference with the 
situation in any of the republics might lead to 
the balance of power being upset, to internal 
chaos and an escalation of violence, especially 
if this were Chechen interference. The attitude 
towards Chechens is definitely negative across 
the Northern Caucasus; they are viewed as re-
gional imperialists. Tension between Chechnya 
and the neighbouring republics is addition-
ally stoked by the Chechen territorial claims 
(Khasavyurt in Dagestan and Sunzha District in 
Ingushetia) and the issue of the Chechen mi-
nority in Dagestan19.
In political terms, the present situation is to 
some extent reminiscent of that in 1998–1999. 
Back then radical Chechen groupings (led by 
Shamil Basayev and the commander of foreign 
militants, Khattab) made efforts to reinforce 
their own political position by interfering with 
the situation in Dagestan (offering support to 
Dagestani Salafis). Two so-called Congresses of 
Muslims of Chechnya and Dagestan were held 
in Grozny (1998, 1999). During the congress-
es, Salafis from Chechnya and Dagestan an-
nounced they would ‘liberate’ Dagestan from 
Russia. Then a Chechen military intervention in 
Dagestan took place (end of summer and be-
ginning of autumn 1999), which led to the out-
break of the Second Chechen War. 
In the preceding years, Ramzan Kadyrov would 
make numerous attempts to interfere with the 
internal affairs of the neighbouring republics 
(for example, attempts by Chechen troops to 
conduct special operations in Ingushetia), but 
this met with a negative reaction from Mos-
cow and convinced Kadyrov to withdraw. Nev-
ertheless, the fact that Kadyrov is playing the 
‘anti-Wahhabi’ card places the Kremlin in an 
awkward situation. It appears that a further 
strengthening of the Chechen leader and in-
tensifying tension in the Northern Caucasus 
are not in the Kremlin’s interest. On the oth-
er hand, the government would find it diffi-
cult to present any arguments negating the 
19 There are around 100,000 ethnic Chechens (also known 
as Akkintsy) in Dagestan. They live mainly in Khasavyurt 
(where they make up around 30% of the residents) and 
in Novolaksky District which borders Chechnya. Dages-
tanis fear that, with support from Grozny, local ethnic 
Chechens may in future demand that the region become 
part of Chechnya. See, for example, http://kavpolit.com/
articles/v_dagestane_ubezhdeny_chto_vosstanovlennyj_
auhovsk-4473/
Given the vast significance of Islam in 
the socio-political life of the present-day 
Caucasus, the escalating conflict be-
tween the Salafi and the Sufi communities 
has a great destabilising potential.
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need to combat ‘Wahhabism’/terrorism, since 
it has itself employed similar rhetoric in do-
mestic and foreign policy. Furthermore, the 
proven Chechen model (ensuring stability 
through terror), especially in the situation of 
aggravating deteriorating economic crisis, may 
appear appealing to Russian decision-makers. 
Moscow, wishing to avoid the scenario of 
a regional struggle against radical Islam under 
Kadyrov’s leadership, may – as a pre-emptive 
measure – intensify repressions against Salafis 
in Dagestan and Ingushetia, employing fed-
eral law enforcement agencies in the process. 
However, the Salafi communities there as so 
strong and hardened (hundreds of thousands 
of young people who have their own structures 
and leaders) that an attempt to destroy them 
completely (as was the case in Chechnya after 
1999) might end up in a large-scale military 
confrontation. Furthermore, intensifying the 
persecution of Salafis would serve the interests 
of the armed Islamic underground in the Cauca-
sus (the Caucasus Emirate and the troops who 
have sworn loyalty to Islamic State20), which 
has found itself in a serious crisis partly due to 
the outflow of volunteer fighters to the Middle 
East. This might trigger it to resort to armed 
and terrorist activity. 
A possible escalation of violence in the Northern 
Caucasus would also pose some threats to Eu-
rope. It might provoke an upsurge in the num-
ber of refugees fleeing from the region to the 
20 A schism took place in Caucasus Emirate in late 2014/ear-
ly 2015 when most of the commanders and fighters in 
Chechnya and Dagestan swore an oath to Islamic State. 
EU (at least 100,000 Chechen refugees are al-
ready resident there) that could be deliberately 
fomented by the Russian government. 
The Russian ‘Middle East’
The developments observed at present illustrate 
more extensive processes which have been tak-
ing place in the eastern part of the Northern 
Caucasus for decades. The region has been un-
dergoing a rapid re-Islamisation and de-Russifi-
cation, and has been moving away from Russia 
in civilisational and cultural terms. At present, 
Islam plays the key social and political role in 
Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia (and to 
a lesser extent also in the other republics21); it 
organises life in the republics and is the driving 
force of events in the region. The signs of the en-
croaching Islamisation include: participation in 
religious life on a massive scale, the existence of 
Sharia courts (including applying Sharia to civil 
issues), the vats socio-political impact of the di-
vides between the various branches of Islam, the 
increasingly frequent cases of polygamy, the fact 
that Islam dictates what should and what should 
not be done in public life (for example, women 
working for the state administration in Chechn-
ya are obliged to wear headscarves, restrictions 
on the sale of alcohol and public smoking during 
Ramadan, etc.), the fact that politicians partici-
pate in religious life and religious leaders in po-
litical life, treating imams and Sharia courts as de 
facto state institutions, the increasingly frequent 
use of the Arabic language and Arabised ver-
sions of surnames in place of Russian ones, etc.
In turn, the Russian social, political, legal and 
cultural reality are becoming something alien 
to residents of the eastern part of the Cauca-
sus. In effect, the region, with a population of 
almost 5 million22, is part of the Russian Fed-
21 Northern Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cher-
kessia and Adygea.
22 According to official data (census of 2010), 2.9 million 
people live in Dagestan, 1.26 million live in Chechnya 
and 400,000 live in Ingushetia. 
The situation in the Northern Caucasus fits 
in with the process of the cultural and ci-
vilisational de-Sovietisation and de-Rus-
sification of the former USSR. However, 
this does not have to mean a weakening 
of Russian political influence.
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eration but has more and more in common 
with the Middle East than with Russia. This is 
taking place with the tacit acceptance from the 
Russian government, who lack ideas as well as 
the financial and human resources to make an 
attempt to re-integrate the Caucasus with the 
rest of Russia. 
The situation in the Northern Caucasus – along 
with the developments in Ukraine, Central Asia 
and Georgia – fits in with the process which is 
gradually taking place all over the former USSR. 
This is an ongoing, albeit slow, disintegration 
of the post-Soviet area (which is for Moscow 
synonymous to the ‘natural’ area of Russian in-
fluence) in the social, political and cultural-ci-
vilisational dimensions. This process is taking 
place in a natural way, regardless of Russia’s 
intense attempts to slow it down (for example, 
in the information and propaganda area). This 
undermines the civilisational efforts the Tsarist 
and the Soviet empires made for more than 
two hundred years, and is also proof of how 
unattractive the modern Russian socio-cultural 
model is. The process of a cultural and civili-
sational de-Sovietisation and de-Russification 
of the former USSR, however, does not have 
to mean a weakening of the Russian political 
influence. For centuries, empires, including the 
Russian one, have successfully managed terri-
tories that are completely different from the 
metropolises in cultural, social, religious and 
other terms. The conditions which have been 
changing since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
have only forced the Russian government to 
make hasty adjustments and to make its pol-
icy towards such areas as the Caucasus more 
flexible. Moscow has done this successfully (for 
example, with regard to Chechnya23, Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia and Armenia, adopting various 
management strategies to these areas). 
23 For more information, see: Maciej Falkowski, Ramzani-
stan. Russia’s Chechen problem, OSW Point of View, Au-
gust 2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-
view/2015-08-25/ramzanistan-russias-chechen-problem
